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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1984, the state legislature enacted
the California Endangered Species Act
(CESA).' In recognition of the state's
unique natural diversity and the run-
away population growth which threatens
to destroy it, CESA's primary purpose is
to afford protection to animal and plant
species whose populations and/or habi-
tats have so seriously declined that their
very survival is called into question.
Under CESA since 1984, the state Fish
and Game Commission (FGC)-usually
upon the recommendation of the
Department of Fish and Game (DFG)-
has studied, recognized, and "listed" as
threatened or endangered 71 animals
and 140 plants.' This listing entitles
those species to certain protections from
governmental and private incursions.
In an era when excessive govern-
mental regulation lacking traditional
justification flourishes, CESA's purpose
is particularly defensible. It seeks to pre-
vent the ultimate irreparable harm: the
forever-irreversible extinction of a
California species. It is not absolute; it
bends-perhaps overly so-to the needs
of a 30,000,000-citizen state. At best, it
is a modest attempt to balance the devel-
oper's pocketbook with the conserva-
tionist's zeal; it simply requires-in the-
ory-the state (and those who must
secure permission from the state to build
or develop) to step back, think, and per-
haps to seek alternatives to minimize
adverse effects on species in danger of
extinction.
But CESA doesn't work. In its latest
report on the status of species as endan-
gered or threatened, DFG acknowledged
that 71% of the listed plant and animal
species-that is, those which have
already passed through the lengthy and
arduous listing process- are further
declining3 DFG also acknowledged 650
unlisted species which, in the words of
DFG, "could presently meet the criteria
for listing" but have not yet been for-
mally addressed by FGC and DFG.4
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These species lack the prospect of time-
ly palliatives to slow their possible
descent to extinction.
Despite the wide-ranging effects of
CESA, very little has been written about
it. No appellate court decisions have
interpreted the Act,5 and no legal articles
on either the Act or its implications have
been published. This article examines
CESA and its demonstrated deficien-
cies: it is too cumbersome and restric-
tive for developers; it is too difficult and
expensive for environmentalists; the
state lacks the money and the will to
resource it properly; the agencies
responsible for enforcing it lack authori-
ty, resources, and commitment, and are
hampered by structural and political
impediments; and it is too lengthy for
endangered plant and animal species,
which are literally dying out while wait-
ing to be listed.
If it seeks to make good on the
promise of CESA, the legislature should
take a hard look at the language of the
statute, the regulatory process it creates,
the agencies responsible for implement-
ing it, and its overall commitment to
conserving and preserving California's
fish, wildlife, and plants for future gen-
erations.
II. THE ACT
In enacting CESA, the legislature
declared its intent that animals and
plants threatened with extinction
deserve and will receive protection by
the state. The legislature's concerns are
expressed within the Act itself:
The Legislature hereby finds and
declares all of the following:
(a) Certain species of fish,
wildlife, and plants have been ren-
dered extinct as a consequence of
man's activities, untempered by ade-
quate concern and conservation.
(b) Other species of fish,
wildlife, and plants are in danger of,
or are threatened with, extinction
because their habitats are threatened
with destruction, adverse modifica-
tion, or severe curtailment, or
because of overexploitation, disease,
predation, or other factors.
(c) These species of fish,
wildlife, and plants are of ecological,
educational, historical, recreational,
aesthetic, economic, and scientific
value to the people of this state, and
the conservation, protection, and
enhancement of these species and
their habitat is of statewide concern.
6
To carry out this intent, CESA sets
forth a variety of mechanisms: (1) a list-
ing procedure for the identification of
species at risk; (2) a range of protections
for listed species from harm caused by
state-sponsored, funded, or approved
projects;' and (3) a "consultation"
requirement, whereby state agencies
wishing to carry out projects which may
adversely impact a listed species are
required to consult with DFG to deter-
mine reasonable alternatives which will
alleviate that impact, or mitigation and
species enhancement measures if there
is no reasonable alternative to the pro-
ject as proposed. These mechanisms are
described in detail below.
A. The Listing Procedure
1. Listing in the Normal Course.
Article 2 of the Act specifies the process
for listing a species.8 The law allows
FGC to grant one of two designations
-threatened or endangered-to a par-
ticular species. As used in the statute, an"endangered" species is defined as:
a native species or subspecies of
bird, mammal, fish, amphibian, rep-
tile, or plant which is in serious dan-
ger of becoming extinct throughout
all, or a significant portion, of its
range due to one or more causes,
including loss of habitat, change in
habitat, overexploitation, predation,
competition, or disease.9
A "threatened" species is defined as:
a native species or subspecies of a
bird, mammal, fish, amphibian, rep-
tile, or plant that, although not
presently threatened with extinction,
is likely to become an endangered
species in the foreseeable future in
the absence of the special protection
and management efforts required by
this chapter.'"
CESA requires FGC to establish a
list of both threatened and endangered
species. It also authorizes the Commission
to add or remove species from these lists
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if the best scientific information avail-
able to the Commission warrants such
action." The statute allows interested
parties to petition the Commission to
place a species on either list. Further, in
the absence of a third party petition,
DFG may propose the addition or dele-
tion of a species.'2
To be preliminarily accepted by
FGC, a petition for listing must include
sufficient scientific information to show
that the proposed action "may be war-
ranted."'3 The scientific data required to
be contained in a listing petition
includes information on the species'
population trend; range, distribution,
abundance, and life history of the
species; factors affecting the ability of
the population to survive and reproduce;
the degree and immediacy of the threat;
and the availability and sources of this
scientific information." Because listing
a species as either threatened or endan-
gered is both costly and potentially dis-
ruptive to state and private interests,'"
the legislature has imposed a heavy bur-
den on petitioners to demonstrate that a
proposed listing is warranted.
If a submitted petition contains all
the specified scientific information, the
Commission has ten days in which to
refer it to DFG for evaluation.6 The
Department then has ninety days in
which to evaluate the petition and make
a recommendation as to whether the
species deserves protective status, based
on the information contained in the peti-
tion.'7 Following the ninety-day evalua-
tion period, FGC must schedule the peti-
tion and DFG's recommendation for
consideration at its next available public
meeting."
If DFG makes a positive recommen-
dation and the Commission agrees, the
petitioned species is then considered a
"candidate"."' This does not mean that
the species has been listed; rather, "can-
didate" status is an interim step indicat-
ing that the Department is evaluating the
status of this species to determine
whether it warrants the permanent pro-
tections afforded through listing.2'
Following FGC's preliminary accep-
tance of the petition and designation of
the species as a "candidate", DFG has
twelve months in which to review the
status of the species and make a recom-
mendation to FGC as to permanent list-
ing. DFG must provide a written report
to the Commission, "based upon
the best scientific information avail-
able...which indicates whether the peti-
tioned action is warranted, which
includes a preliminary identification of
the habitat that may be essential to the
continued existence of the species, and
which recommends management activi-
ties and other recommendations for
recovery of the species."2'
Following receipt of DFG's report
and recommendation, FGC must sched-
ule the petition for "final consideration"
at its next available meeting.2 At that
meeting, the Commission must decide
whether the petitioned action is warrant-
ed. It should be emphasized that the
Commission's final decision on the peti-
tion is wholly discretionary. The statute
sets forth no specific criteria which, if
present, would require FGC to list a
species. The statute only requires DFG
to recommend and FGC to adopt "crite-
ria for determining if a species is endan-
gered or threatened."23 However, nothing
in either the statute or the applicable
regulations4 requires FGC to list a
species under any circumstances.
If FGC finds that the proposed
species deserves protection, it must then
publish a notice of proposed rulemaking
in the California Regulatory Notice
Register, open the proposal to public
comments for a minimum 45-day peri-
od, schedule an optional public hearing
on the proposal, formally adopt the pro-
posed listing at a public meeting, com-
pile the administrative rulemaking
record for review by the Office of
Administrative Law (OAL), submit it to
OAL, and await OAL's approval after a
thirty-day review period.25 If the
Commission denies the petition or fails
to act, the petitioner may seek judicial
review through a petition for writ of
mandate pursuant to Code of Civil
Procedure section 1094.5.26
2. Emergency Listing. Aside from the
normal petitioning procedure, CESA's
Article 2 also allows FGC to immediate-
ly list a species on an urgency basis if it
finds "that there is any emergency pos-
ing a significant threat to the continued
existence" of a particular species.
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Designed primarily as a safety valve,
this authority permits emergency listing
where exigent circumstances so justify.
If a given species is endangered to the
point of extinction and the normal rule-
making process will take too long, the
Commission has the power to immedi-
ately list the species." The listing is tem-
porary in nature, and must be followed
by rulemaking in order to confer perma-
nent protection.
3. Periodic Review and Reporting.
Article 2 also requires DFG to conduct a
periodic review of all listed species to
ensure they warrant continued protec-
tion. Each species is to be reviewed
every five years to determine whether
the conditions that resulted in the origi-
nal listing are still present. This review
shall include "identification of the habi-
tat that may be essential to the continued
existence of the species and the depart-
ment's recommendations for manage-
ment activities and other recommenda-
tions for recovery of the species."29
DFG is required to submit reports on
its five-year review of each listed
species to FGC.3 0 If a five-year report
includes a recommendation to add or
remove a species from the list, the report
is to be treated as a petition pursuant to
section 2072.7 of the Code, thus trigger-
ing the one-year DFG formal evaluation
period.'
By January 30 of each year, DFG is
also required to submit o FGC, the leg-
islature, the Governor, and the public an
annual report summarizing the status of





1. Prohibition on Taking. CESA's
Article 3 sets forth several specific pro-
tections for listed species. Under the
Act, no person may import into
California, export from California, or
take, possess, purchase, or sell within
California any listed species (with speci-
fied exceptions).3 This prohibition
applies to any endangered, threatened,
and-under certain conditions- candi-
date species."
The Act also provides some protec-
tion for the "habitat essential to the con-
tinued existence" of listed species. State
agencies are prohibited from approving
projects which would "result in the
destruction or adverse modification of a
listed species' habitat."'3
2. Consultations. The heart of
CESA's protections lies in its "consulta-
tion" requirement. Once a species is list-
ed by FGC, a state "lead agency"6 (that
is, the state agency which is carrying out
a project, or which is primarily responsi-
ble for approving a project) must consult
with DFG, in accordance with the guide-
lines developed by the Department,3 "to
ensure that any action authorized, fund-
ed, or carried out by that state lead agen-
cy is not likely to jeopardize the contin-
ued existence of any endangered or
threatened species."'8 When a lead agen-
cy consults with DFG on a proposed
project, the Department must "issue a
written finding based on its determina-
tion of whether a proposed project
would jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of any endangered species or
threatened species or result in the
destruction or adverse modification of
habitat essential to the continued exis-
tence of the species."'9
CESA includes an unequivocal
statement: "[a] state lead agency shall
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not approve a project which would like-
ly result in the extinction of any endan-
gered species or threatened species."'
However, short of that circumstance,
state agencies may undertake projects
which do result in harm to listed
species, under specified conditions.
If, after consultation, DFG finds that
a lead agency's proposed project would
jeopardize a listed species, "the depart-
ment shall determine and specify to the
state lead agency reasonable and pru-
dent alternatives consistent with con-
serving the species which would prevent
jeopardy to the continued existence of
the species or the destruction or adverse
modification of the habitat essential to
the continued existence of the species."'
The lead agency must incorporate
these "reasonable and prudent alterna-
tives" into the specifications for its pro-
posed project," unless "specific eco-
nomic, social, or other conditions make
infeasible the alternatives" prescribed
by DFG.41 In that case, the lead agency
may proceed with its project if both of
the following conditions are met: (1) the
lead agency requires "reasonable miti-
gation and enhancement measures a are
necessary and appropriate to minimize
the adverse impacts of the project" upon
the endangered or threatened species or
its habitat; and (2) the lead agency finds
both that the "benefits of the project as
proposed clearly outweigh the benefits
of the project were it to be carried out
with the reasonable and prudent alterna-
tives," and that it has not made "an irre-
versible or irretrievable commitment" of
resources to the project after commenc-
ing consultation with DFG, which "has
the effect of foreclosing the opportunity
for formulating and implementing rea-
sonable and prudent alternatives consis-
tent with conserving the species....44
Thus, while consultations with DFG
are required, the lead agency may
approve projects over Departmental
objections, so long as there is no threat
of extinction to a listed species, reason-
able mitigation measures are included in
the project, and the importance of the
state activity as proposed outweighs the
project as compromised through incor-
poration of alternatives aimed at pre-
serving the species.
In spite of this limitation, the consul-
tation requirement is critical because it
attempts to institutionalize species and
habitat preservation as a statewide goal
with consistent application by a single
responsible agency (DFG). Procedurally,
it is crucial because it puts the burden of
notice to and consultation with DFG on
the state lead agency seeking to com-
plete the project. Despite the importance
of the consultation requirement to the
purpose of CESA, it will sunset on
January 1, 1994, unless the legislature
acts to extend it.
4
1
In 1989, 15 state lead agencies initi-
ated 56 formal project consultations
with DFG." Of these consultations, no
challenges to Department findings were
made, and no consultations finalized in
1989 resulted in jeopardy findings.7
C. Recovery of Listed Species
The purpose of CESA is to ensure
the survival of California's native plant
and wildlife populations despite soaring
population growth and unprecedented
development throughout the state. While
the Act offers protection to listed
species, its ultimate goal is to ensure
recovery of these groups to the point of
viability. 8 The protections afforded by
CESA and other more drastic restoration
efforts have successfully halted or
reversed dramatic declines in some
California listed species.
One example is the California
Bighorn Sheep. While the species
remains listed by the state as threatened,
careful management efforts have led to a
substantial increase in its numbers.
When the Bighorn Sheep was listed, it
was estimated that its population con-
sisted of 195 animals. Following the
imposition of protection from poaching,
reduced competition from domestic live-
stock, water development, and success-
ful reintroduction programs, the Bighorn
population increased to 327.1 Although
this species will never be as abundant as
it once was, careful management has
enabled the Bighorn to increase and
securely occupy portions of its former
range.'
Another notable example is the
California Condor. The Condor once
thrived within the state. However, due to
killings by ranchers, pesticide use, and
lead poisoning, the species declined to
the edge of extinction. To prevent the
complete loss of this species, federal
and state officials were forced to remove
these birds from the wild in 1987 and
place them in captive breeding pro-
grams. Now, all known condors are in
captivity in the Los Angeles and San
Diego zoos. Through these programs,
the birds have reproduced; the current
population stands at 32 condors.' The
return of the California Condor to the
wild will not occur until at least 1992.52
DFG's 1989 Annual Report on the
status of listed species states that several
other endangered species, such as the
bald eagle, peregrine falcon, and
California brown pelican, are "on the
road to recovery as their numbers have
increased in response to active manage-
ment programs and controls on pollu-
tants." 3
However, DFG/FGC critics chasten
the two agencies for what they call "bio-
logical brinkmanship": in spite of
overwhelming scientific evidence,
DFG/FGC often refuse to act until a
species is at the absolute verge of
extinction.' As in the case of the con-
dor, once the species is finally listed,
DFG and FGC are then required to take
(or recommend to lead agencies) far
more costly and drastic measures than
would have been required had the agen-
cies acted earlier. These last-minute
efforts are also less effective, because
the species has been allowed to dwindle
to the point where the gene pool has
become biologically depleted.
Further, these isolated successes are
overshadowed by the very disturbing
"big picture" presented by DFG itself in
its 1989 report: "71% of the listed
plant and animal species are declin-
ing."-" The reason for this decline, says
DFG, is the "destruction and degrada-
tion of endangered species habitat
through a variety of direct and indirect
human impacts."6 Further, "[m]any of
our endangered species survive as very
small, fragmented populations in habitat
degraded by human activities. Under
such conditions, there is no certainty
that they will survive for long."57
Finally, DFG notes that 34 animal
species and subspecies have already
become extinct in California.8 These
facts, as admitted by DFG, indicate that
a critical review of CESA, DFG, FGC,
and California's commitment to preser-
vation of its natural flora and fauna is
long overdue.
III. THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
CESA AND THE AGENCIES
RESPONSIBLE FOR
ENFORCING IT
DFG's own finding that 71% of list-
ed species are declining- that is,
species already recognized by the state
as endangered or threatened and receiv-
ing the statute's substantive protec-
tions- is indicative of serious problems
within the statute itself and within DFG
and FGC, the entities responsible for
implementing and enforcing CESA. A
close look at the statute reveals that it is
fraught with loopholes and weaknesses;
in fact, the listing procedure created by
the statute-rather than preventing the
irreparable harm resulting from the
complete extinction of a species-prob-
ably contributes to serious and costly
decline through its sheer length. A criti-
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cal appraisal of the structure and perfor-
mance of DFG and FGC-several of
which have been performed by other
government agencies, task forces, and
public interest groups in the past few
years-reveals that major changes are
needed if the legislature is truly serious
about protection of California's endan-
gered species.
A. CESA Is Weak and
Filled With Loopholes
1. Delay. One of the most accepted
and traditional justifications for the cre-
ation of regulatory mechanisms is the
prevention of external costs, particularly
irreparable harm, which would other-
wise occur in the absence of regulation.9
With its goal of preventing permanent
extinction of native California species,
CESA has a highly defensible theoreti-
cal justification.
However, the particular regulatory
scheme created in CESA to accomplish
its goal is self-defeating. The normal-
course listing procedure and rulemaking
proceeding together take a minimum of
644 days 6 -or one year and nine
months after a serious threat to the
species is already documentable and
documented. This figure assumes that
FGC meets promptly after receipt of
DFG information (which is not always
the case), that DFG is expeditious in
preparing its rulemaking filings and
record (which is not always the case),
and that the Office of Administrative
Law does not find fault with the rule-
making record.6' This degree of built-in,
required delay is inexcusable, especially
where time is of the essence and
irreparable harm is imminent. FGC's
emergency listing procedure has the
potential to ameliorate this weakness,
but it has never been used by FGC.62
2. FGC Is Not Required To Act. As
noted above, nothing in CESA requires
the Commission to list a species under
any circumstances. FGC's decisionmak-
ing authority at all points in the
listing process is wholly discretionary.
Although the Department is required to
rely on and present to the Commission
"the best scientific information avail-
able,' 63 the statute sets forth no criteria
or circumstances under which the
Commission is required to list a species,
and no requirement that it rely on that
scientific information.
Further, although CESA requires
FGC to adopt "criteria for determining
if a species is endangered or threat-
ened," the standards FGC has adopted
for itself are none too specific. Under
the California Code of Regulations, the
Commission "shall" list a species "if the
Commission determines that its contin-
ued existence is in serious danger or it is
threatened by any one or any combina-
tion of the following factors: (1) present
or threatened modification or destruc-
tion of its habitat; (2) overexploitation;
(3) predation; (4) competition; (5) dis-
ease; or (6) other natural occurrences or
human related activities.5 None of these
vague terms are further defined or quan-
tified in any meaningful way. Moreover,
in adopting this regulation, FGC has
merely restated (almost verbatim) statu-
tory language,66 and has arguably adopt-
ed no listing criteria as directed by the
legislature in the five years CESA has
existed.
During the latter half of 1989, FGC
rejected five petitions for listing, in the
face of strong evidence presented by
state biologists and other experts that the
species were seriously threatened and
that they would continue to deteriorate
in the absence of government interven-
tion. "The Commission rejected the five
species in the absence of any testimony
challenging the biological merits of list-
ing and with no public discussion on the
scant written arguments from scientists
hired by the opposition."67
This grant of unbridled discretion
and absence of mandatory criteria effec-
tively insulates FGC listing decisions
from judicial review. A listing decision
is reviewable by a court under the "sub-
stantial evidence" test;6 that is, the court
must uphold FGC's listing decision if its
findings are supported by substantial
evidence in light of the whole record.'
This limited judicial review allows no
weighing of the evidence by the court;
the court is not permitted to substitute
its judgment for that of FGC. If a listing
decision is ever challenged in court, the
court will be reviewing the validity of
FGC's decision without the benefit of
any concrete, defined, or quantitative
standards to guide the decisionmaking
of FGC. In such cases, courts usually
defer to and rarely overturn agencies.
3. CESA Allows Harm to Listed
Species. Two key criticisms of this law
are that it does not apply directly to any-
one but the state (e.g., CESA does not
require local governments to consult
with DFG when they wish to engage in
a project which will impact a listed
species),6 and that it then permits the
state to harm a listed species." Many
environmentalists would prefer stronger
language which insulates listed species
from harm. However, as one of the pri-
mary authors of this statute noted,
"Given the climate in the legislature in
1984, we were very lucky to get this bill
out of committee, let alone get it passed
and signed by the Governor."
Because no appellate court cases
have tested this statute,"3 the precise
extent of the protections for listed
species conferred by CESA remains
unclear. No actions have been taken to
force agencies to halt projects that may
threaten listed species,' and the Act
contains no sanctions for state agencies
which approve projects which fail to
comply with its provisions.
4. CESA Grants DFG No Real
Authority in the Consultation Process.
As described above, state lead agencies
wishing to engage in projects which
may impact the continued existence of a
listed species must consult with DFG,
and DFG must make a written jeopardy
finding with respect to the species."
While the Department may describe and
insist that the lead agency incorporate
reasonable and prudent alternatives
which would prevent jeopardy to the
listed species, that lead agency may
ignore the Department's suggestions so
long as it incorporates mitigation mea-
sures and it finds both that the project as
proposed is of significant public benefit
and that it has not acted in bad faith by
infusing money into the project after
DFG consultation has commenced.6 In
describing DFG's chances of forcing the
use of alternatives, the top Department
official in charge of implementing
CESA stated, "If push came to shove,
and we insisted, we would probably
lose.""
5. FGC Is Free to Engage in Ex
Parte Contacts and Ignores Conflict of
Interest Prohibitions. The five-member
Fish and Game Commission is the state
policymaking board responsible for
deciding, at a public and open meeting,
whether to designate a species as a "can-
didate", and (one year later) whether to
list a species as endangered or threat-
ened, thus affording it the permanent
protections of CESA. These listing deci-
sions may be expensive ones for many
interested parties, yet nothing in CESA
or the Fish and Game Code prevents
FGC commissioners from engaging in
off-the-record, ex parte contacts outside
the public hearing at which the decision
is made.
Further, FGC members appear to be
unaware of or unwilling to follow state
law prohibiting participation in an offi-
cial vote which constitutes a conflict of
interest."6 The Sacramento Bee discov-
ered that FGC Commissioner Benjamin
F. Biaggini-former chair, chief
executive officer, and director of
Southern Pacific Transportation
Company-recently voted against a pro-
posed listing which would have resulted
in restrictions on Southern Pacific's use
of a railroad right of way. He also voted
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to reject the proposed listing of the flat-
tailed horned lizard; its territory
includes land set aside for geothermal
exploration and production by Southern
California Edison and Unocal Inc.
According to the Bee, Biaggini owns
more than $100,000 of stock in each of
those companies.9
B. The Agencies Responsible for
Implementing CESA
The discussion above points out
serious weaknesses in the drafting and
structure of CESA itself. However, even
the best-drafted statute is only as good
as the agency implementing it. The
Commission on California State
Government Organization and Economy
("Little Hoover Commission" or
"LHC") recently completed a yearlong
study of the structure and performance
of both DFG and FGC.0 According to
the Little Hoover Commission, if the
legislature is committed to the preserva-
tion of California's unique flora and
fauna, it must not only strengthen
CESA; it must dramatically revamp the
structure and resources of the agencies
responsible for implementing it.
1. The Little Hoover Commission's
Evaluation of DFG and FGC. LHC's
report first focuses on the historical pur-
pose of the two agencies, the gradual
shift in legislative policy and public
opinion toward environmental con-
sciousness and conservation, and the
failure of the two agencies to adjust
their orientations to that mandated
focus.
In 1951, the legislature created DFG
as part of the state Resources Agency;
its primary (and admittedly vast)
responsibility is the management of
California's fish and wildlife resources.'
In creating DFG, the legislature vested
in one department the duty and authority
to pursue four main objectives: (1) to
maintain all species of wildlife; (2) to
provide for diversified recreation; (3) to
provide an economic contribution to
California's economy; and (4) to pro-
mote scientific and educational use
through management of fish and
wildlife." DFG, which maintains five
regional offices throughout the state, is
administered by a Director, who is
appointed by the Governor and con-
firmed by the Senate for an indetermi-
nate term.83
Pursuant to Article IV, section 20 of
the California Constitution, the Fish and
Game Commission is the policymaking
board of the Department. It is composed
of five part-time commissioners, all
appointed by the Governor, who serve
for six-year terms.' Other than receiv-
ing Senate confirmation, commissioners
need not possess any specific qualifica-
tions in order to be appointed. FGC's
general charge is to formulate policies
governing the conduct of DFG. FGC is
required to hold at least ten public meet-
ings per year-8 and is subject to the
Bagley-Keene Open Meetings Act" and
the Administrative Procedure Act;8'
thus, it must adopt regulations and con-
duct its decisionmaking at public, open
meetings after notice to the public and
an opportunity for comment.
Whereas the "original charter" of
FGC was to "provide for reasonably
structured taking of California's fish and
game," 8 FGC is now responsible for
determining hunting and fishing season
dates and regulations, setting license
fees for fish and game taking, listing
endangered species, granting permits to
conduct otherwise prohibited activities
(e.g., scientific taking of protected
species for research), and acquiring~and
maintaining lands needed for habitat
conservation." This list is by no means
comprehensive; it merely serves to illus-
trate the variety of sometimes-conflict-
ing activities that receive Commission
attention.
As noted, the Commission and the
Department were created to administer a
broad legislative mandate. These far-
reaching responsibilities have become
increasingly difficult due to California's
astounding population growth and the
housing and development needed to
accommodate that growth. In addition,
over the years the legislature has
required FGC and DFG to incorporate
and implement an entirely new set
of priorities. These directives-embod-
ied in CESA and the California
Environmental Quality Act (CEQA)
-now require DFG and FGC to effec-
tively guard and conserve California's
wildlife populations and their habitat,
rather than simply maintaining them for
their structured taking by hunters and
fishers. Under CEQA, "the maintenance
of a quality environment for the people
of this state now and in the future is a
matter of statewide concern," and every
citizen, corporation, and public agency
"has a responsibility to contribute to the
preservation and enhancement of the
environment."' This mandate expressly
includes preventing the elimination of
fish and wildlife species, insuring that
fish and wildlife populations do not drop
below self-perpetuating levels, and pre-
serving for future generations represen-
tations of all plant and animal communi-
ties and examples of the major periods
of California history.9' Under CEQA,
DFG is a "trustee agency": "a state
agency having jurisdiction by law over
natural resources ...which are held in
trust for the people of the State of
California."'
The expanding role of DFG/FGC in
protecting California's environment now
includes many responsibilities that were
never contemplated when either were
created. While the Little Hoover
Commission's report focused on the per-
formance of both entities in administer-
ing all of their statutory responsibilities,
some of the Commission's findings are
particularly relevant to the ability of
DFG/FGC to adequately implement
CESA:
*There are no clear and publicly
understood criteria for selection and
appointment of Fish and Game
Commissioners. "The Fish and Game
Commission's mandate and related
activities have grown far beyond the
time when the good intentions and hon-
est opinions of five sportspersons could
be relied on to mold the state's natural
resources policies."9
*FGC, as presently structured, can-
not adequately exercise its statutory
authority over the Department. The
Hoover report discussed several facets
of this criticism: (1) the Department
Director is selected by the Governor (as
are the FGC Commissioners), instead of
serving at the pleasure of FGC; (2) the
current DFG Director has stated that his
primary responsibility is to the
Governor, and not to "FGC; (3) FGC is
necessarily reliant on DFG for research
and scientific information, due to FGC's
minimal staff and resources; (4) FGC is
not an effective, viable policymaker for
DFG, because the Commission's consti-
tutionally authorized structure places it
outside the executive branch, and FGC's
ability to exercise administrative control
over DFG's implementation of policy is
undercut; and (5) there is little or no"unity of perspective, unity of opera-
tion," or even formal relationship among
DFG, FGC, and the Resources Agency
within which both reside.94
*FGC has difficulty in meeting its
mandate because of external pressures.
The Little Hoover Commission noted
the "wildly conflicting pressures" of try-
ing to allow hunters and fishers their tra-
ditional access to fish and game, while
simultaneously attempting to maintain
the natural diversity and populations of
California's wildlife. 9' The Hoover
report noted that this problem is espe-
cially serious in cases where scientific
evidence is not available or is inconclu-
sive; in these and other cases, FGC has
often bowed to political pressures from
executive branch appointees and/or to
its own apparent internal bias in favor of
sportspeople.
9 6
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*Both DFG and FGC are under-
funded; DFG is not capable of appro-
priately allocating resources. FGC,
which is staffed by an Executive
Secretary, an Assistant Executive
Secretary, and five clerical support posi-
tions, was allocated only $429,000 in
1989-90. It is thus required to rely heav-
ily on DFG staff resources for technical
and support research and assistance.97
In 1988-89, DFG's six offices func-
tioned with a staff of 1,568 full-time
positions and a total budget of $118 mil-
lion.9" In that same year, DFG's overall
budget was funded from several revenue
sources, including $12.5 million from
the California Environmental License
Plate Fund, $67.9 million from the Fish
and Game Preservation Fund (which
includes all monies from the sale of
licenses, permits, fees, and/or penalties),
$15.7 million from the federal govern-
ment, and $8.9 million from the state's
general fund. CESA implementation is
funded through DFG's Natural Heritage
Account, which received $11.2 million
in 1988-89. This account was decreased
to $10.3 million in 1989-90, and the
Governor's proposed 1990-91 budget
would further decrease the funding for
this account to $8.9 million," despite the
increasing size of the state's threatened
and endangered populations."
Both DFG and its critics agree that
these numbers are insufficient to finance
the Department's mandated responsibili-
ties.1'' Further, "both critics and the
DFG suggest the present system of cate-
gorical funding of specific departmental
activities is inconsistent with changing
and accelerating needs."'' 2 This legisla-
tive restriction on DFG's use of particu-
lar funds for particular programs, found
in Fish and Game Code section 711,
requires, inter alia, that the costs of all
nongame fish and wildlife programs
(including CESA) be funded only
through appropriations from the state
general fund and sources other than the
Fish and Game Preservation Fund. In
other words, the largest source of DFG
revenue-"consumptive use" fees of
various types (fishing/hunting permits,
licenses, fees)- may only be used to
support "consumptive-oriented" pro-
grams."
This restriction has been identified
by a special Resources Agency task
force as the source of "growing tension
between availability of funding for
game activities (supported by the Fish
and Game Preservation Fund) and for
non-game activities (supported largely
by the General Fund)."'0 5 According to
the task force,
[o]n the one hand, the kinds of
expenditures that can be made from
the Fish and Game Preservation
Fund are statutorily restricted, with
constituent groups actively monitor-
ing revenues derived from fees and
licenses charged to them. On the
other hand, nongame workload has
been growing at a time when the
availability of General Fund rev-
enues has been limited.'"
This "alleged funding imbalance for
nongame activities'"" is exacerbated by
DFG's historical lack of a consistent and
comprehensive cost allocation method-
ology and its inability to account for
expenditures."
Further, the Little Hoover Commis-
sion found that DFG is not capable of
appropriately allocating resources.
The Department cannot provide the
required level of monitoring,
enforcement and timely expertise
and research consistent with the
requirements of its mandate.
Increasingly, policy and implementa-
tion decisions, especially with
respect to staff support to the FGC,
must be made on the basis of incom-
plete or dated information. This situ-
ation is largely determined by the
previously noted lack of sufficient
resources, but also owes itself to an
unfortunate configuration of acceler-
ated (and in some case not fully
informed) public expectations, criti-
cal wildlife and habitat needs and a
late-developing science."
2. Petition Backlog Within FGC and
DFG. In addition to the serious prob-
lems noted by the Little Hoover
Commission, we note that a large and
growing backlog of species is awaiting
action by DFG and FGC-further
corroborating the inadequacy of
DFG/FGC's staff and resources.
California currently lists 280 plants and
animals as endangered, threatened, or
rare."' According to DFG's last count,
the number of additional species that
could presently meet the criteria for list-
ing totals over 650."' These plants and
animals are awaiting Department action
recognizing their dwindling population
numbers. The number in this group
increases constantly and, without action,
is expected to top 1,000 by the year
1994.2
In 1988, with over 600 species whose
population levels warranted attention,
only 33 were reviewed by the
Commission. Of those 33, two were list-
ed and two were rejected. The final 29
(four animals and 25 plants) remained as
candidates for listing, to be reviewed in
1989 following their one-year review
period."3 In 1989, FGC listed the four
animal species and 22 of the plants."'
DFG recommended the listing of two
additional animals (the flat-tailed homed
lizard"5 and the Suisun song sparrow);
however, FGC rejected DFG's recom-
mendations."6
When confronted with these rather
pathetic statistics in light of the huge
number of species awaiting listing and
the irreparable harm at stake, the
Department defended itself by stating
that the lengthy petition process is clear-
ly spelled out in the enabling statute.
The Department argued that simply list-
ing a species without a thorough review
would circumvent the very statute that
environmentalists seek to enforce. DFG
also pointed out that without a complete
study of a petitioned species, some may
be listed that should not be. "If you list
things that do not belong there, you call
into question the legitimacy of other
species that clearly need to be on the
list."' 7
The Department's limited nongame
heritage account, which includes funds
for implementing CESA, is clearly an
inhibiting factor in diminishing the huge
backlog of species which, according to
DFG, probably deserve to be listed now.
A 1987 study of California's natural
diversity prepared at the request of the
Senate Committee on Natural Resources
and Wildlife concluded: "[i]ncreased
scientific and administrative effort is
needed to accelerate the scientific evalu-
ation of species' statuses and to process
the legal documentation required to list
species under [CESA].""
8
3. DFG's Commitment to Enforcing
CESA Is Minimal. Although we previ-
ously criticized CESA for its failure to
vest DFG with any real authority in
CESA's consultation process, DFG
recently refused to enforce the consulta-
tion requirement en toto, and in the pro-
cess abdicated its responsibility as the
guardian of California's endangered
species and its jurisdiction over natural
resources "held in trust for the people of




During the past year, the California
Department of Food and Agriculture
(CDFA) has waged an expensive and
not entirely successful war against the
Mediterranean fruit fly (Medfly) and the
Mexican fruit fly (Mexfly). Since
August 1989, CDFA's discovery of fer-
tile flies in southern California has
resulted in the imposition of "pest eradi-
cation procedures," including broad-
scale aerial malathion spraying.'20
Although several cities have attempted
to halt or postpone the spraying through
petitions for writ of mandate, none have
been successful to date.
One such city-the San Diego sub-
urb of El Cajon-became the target of
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CDFA and its insecticide-laden heli-
copters through a May 10, 1990 deci-
sion of the CDFA Director, as a result of
the discovery of three Mexflies. In its
petition challenging the decision, El
Cajon alleged CDFA's violation of
CESA as one cause of action.2 The
City argued that the second largest pop-
ulation in the United States of the Least
Bell's Vireo-listed as endangered by
FGC since 1980-inhabits an area just
two miles downwind of the malathion
spray zone. El Cajon produced declara-
tions and testimony of several well-
known biologists and entomologists
stating that the birds were nesting at the
time of 'the aerial spraying; that the
birds' primary food source is insects;
and that broad-area aerial malathion
spraying would result in an almost com-
plete loss of the insect population in the
area sprayed. These experts urged a full-
scale evaluation by.DFG of the impact
of the reduced food supply on the adult
birds, foraging for food for the
nestlings, the nestlings themselves, and
on the birds' ability to build up the
nutritional reserves needed for a suc-
cessful migration after the nesting sea-
son is completed.
El Cajon also alleged that CDFA had
failed to comply with CESA's consulta-
tion requirement, thus depriving DFG of
the opportunity to engage in the kind of
evaluation deemed necessary by the
experts. The City based its allegation
upon statements by several relevant
DFG biologists confirming CDFA's fail-
ure to engage in either formal or infor-
mal consultation.'2 2 At most, CDFA had
made one telephone call to DFG "to find
out if there are any endangered species
in the El Cajon area;"'23 CDFA was told
to check DFG's Natural Diversity Data
Bank. Further, that phone call did not
take place until May 17 or 18-well
after the announced decision of the
CDFA Director to commence aerial
spraying in El Cajon. Two biologists in
DFG's regional office covering El Cajon
stated that the phone call and the infor-
mation exchanged in it constituted nei-
ther a formal nor an informal consulta-
tion pursuant to CESA.' 4
In spite of their acknowledgement
that CDFA had failed to engage in any-
thing remotely resembling a bona fide
consultation, the DFG biologists refused
to assist El Cajon. When asked whether
DFG would participate as co-petitioner
in the mandamus action-to assert
DFG's own statutory right to be consult-
ed-DFG's Endangered Species Act
Coordinator refused, stating that his
superiors would never allow such an
action.'25 When asked to provide decla-
rations in support of El Cajon's asser-
tions, several DFG biologists also
refused.'26
At a three-day trial on the City's
motion for permanent injunction, DFG
biologist Krishan Lal-much to the
City's chagrin-apparently turned that
one phone call into a "consultation"
under CESA. In deciding against El
Cajon and permitting the aerial spraying
to continue, Municipal Court Judge J.
Michael Bollman, sitting as a Superior
Court judge, ruled that CDFA did in fact
"consult" with DFG pursuant to
CESA 27
This ruling, which is pending
appeal,'28 devastates CESA's consulta-
tion requirement. The consultation
requirement of CESA's Article 4 clearly
contemplates the exchange of docu-
ments and the details of the proposed
project, an analysis and determination
by DFG based on the "best available
scientific information," and a "written
finding [by DFG] based on its determi-
nation of whether a proposed project
would jeopardize the continued exis-
tence of any endangered species....' ' 12
CDFA's eleventh-hour attempt, now val-
idated by a lower court, does not
approach true compliance with the letter
and spirit of the statute, and the whole
incident is a clear demonstration of
DFG's indifference, weakness, and lacks.
of commitment to its statutory responsi-
bility.
4. Politics in the Listing Process. In
an ideal world, FGC's listing decisions
should depend solely on the scientific
evidence presented with a petition.
Unfortunately, CESA requires no such
thing, and real-world problems and poli-
tics enter into the decisionmaking pro-
cess. "When politics and biology mix,
biology often loses."'30
The most recent example of the
intrusion of politics into what should be
a scientific decision is the case of
California's official state reptile, the
desert tortoise.'3 Since 1984, conserva-
tionist groups such as Defenders of
Wildlife and the Desert Tortoise Council
have been attempting to secure both
state and federal listing for the species,
due to dramatic declines in its popula-
tion in the western Mojave Desert.
Biologists estimate that the tortoise pop-
ulation has dropped 90% in the past fifty
years, and between 30%-70% in the last
eight years alone.'32 The tortoise has
been plagued by a series of problems
including habitat destruction, malnutri-
tion due to loss of native plants to cattle
grazing, theft and wanton shooting by
"plinkers" who use the slow-moving
animals for target practice, and constant
attacks by predators such as ravens.'
Moreover, a viral respiratory infection,
introduced from captured animals
returned to the desert, has affected most
of the remaining wild desert tortoises."M
Despite the substantial evidence
indicating that listing was warranted,
several groups-including ranchers,
mining interests, and off-road vehicle
users-actively opposed listing. If the
tortoise were listed, the state would
restrict cattle grazing, prevent mining,
and halt the use of off-road vehicles in
state-controlled, critical tortoise habitat.
Because the tortoise's range includes
much of the western Mojave Desert,
listing could result in significant limita-
tions on desert use. However, precise
restrictions and their cost are not known,
and are not properly a part of the deci-
sion to list or not to list a species under
the statutory scheme.
After years of delay and debate, FGC
finally designated the tortoise as a "can-
didate" species in November 1987. One
year later, FGC unanimously approved
the proposed listing at its section 2075.5
"final consideration" hearing. on
November 10, 1988,'35 and scheduled a
rulemaking proceeding to amend section
670.5 of its regulations to list the desert
tortoise. 36
While the opposition of these con-
stituencies was expected, the objection
of the federal Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) was not. In a
February 1, 1989 letter to FGC-just
two days before the Commission was
scheduled to vote on proposed rulemak-
ing which would finally list the tortoise,
BLM requested that the state delay list-
ing for two to four years. BLM's stated
reason for this request was that it would
like time to implement protection pro-
grams for the tortoise on federally con-
trolled lands before California acts to
protect the species; BLM also noted that
state listing could be perceived as overly
restrictive by sheep grazers and off-road
vehicle enthusiasts. 
37
Several groups were amazed at
BLM's action, and urged FGC to ignore
it. BLM's position was especially sur-
prising in light of its own studies, which
confirmed a 50% population decline
during the past six years in the western
Mojave desert.'38 The Desert Tortoise
Council, which originally petitioned for
the listing of the tortoise, argued that the
proposed state listing would only
enhance conservation efforts, and would
in no way affect federal projects because
it would not apply to territory under
BLM's jurisdiction. Conservationists
also argued that to delay listing for two
to four years would probably render any
eventual designation meaningless; the
tortoise would probably become extinct
during that time.
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On February 3, 1989, at the meeting
at which FGC was scheduled to vote on
the proposed rulemaking, BLM's own
biologist Kristin Berry stated that the
Commission should ignore the request
of her employer and act immediately to
protect the tortoise. According to Berry,
"The state listing of the desert tortoise is
absolutely essential to maintaining
viable healthy populations, and to stop-
ping severe declines in existing popula-
tions."'39 DFG also strongly endorsed
listing the desert tortoise as threatened.
Despite the substantial scientific
information supporting the petition, its
own earlier unanimous vote at the
"final consideration" hearing, and the
Department's strong backing of the list-
ing, the Commission gave in to the
political pressure, refused to adopt the
proposed rulemaking which would have
effectuated listing on February 3, and
put the matter over until its June meet-
ing.'" While the tortoise was eventually
listed by the Commission in June 1989,
its five-year delay (where time is clearly
of the essence) and 3-2 vote (in spite of
overwhelming scientific evidence) left
many environmental groups understand-
ably skeptical of FGC's commitment to
protecting species.'' If California's offi-
cial state reptile becomes extinct, the
blame may be placed squarely on the
shoulders of BLM and FGC.
42
IV. NEW DIRECTIONS FOR
SPECIES PROTECTION
IN CALIFORNIA
Since CESA became law, many sug-
gestions have been made to amend it
and/or to enact supplemental legislation
which will offer more meaningful pro-
tection to the state's threatened and
endangered populations. Some recom-
mendations focus solely on the procedu-
ral side of the listing process; others
seek to balance the membership of the
Fish and Game Commission and clarify
legislative intent regarding its role and
its relationship to the Department; still
others would give selected species pro-
tective status by bypassing the statute
altogether. This section will identify and
explain the most recent proposals to
change the way in which threatened
species receive protection within the
state.
A. Improving the Listing Process
In 1989, Senator Dan McCorquodale
-disturbed by FGC's stalling on the
desert tortoise petition-introduced SB
999. In its original form, SB 999 would
have shortened the listing process by
forcing the Commission to combine its
section 2075.5 "final consideration"
hearing with the hearing on proposed
rulemaking required by CESA and the
Administrative Procedure Act. As intro-
duced, SB 999 would also have elimi-
nated the required OAL review of a
favorable listing decision, and made the
listing effective upon the date of FGC's
adoption.'3 According to the analysis of
the Assembly Committee on Water,
Parks and Wildlife, "this bill would
close the existing loophole by requiring
the Commission to adopt an implement-
ing rule or regulation upon making its
final decision and by preventing the
Commission from using the Office of
Administrative Law procedures to
thwart the listing procedures contained
in existing statutes."'"
Environmental groups aw this bill as
one way of accelerating and removing
politics from the listing process. Citing
their struggle to list the desert tortoise
despite the scientific evidence that clear-
ly favored its listing, conservationists
viewed this legislation as both necessary
and long overdue.'45 Additionally, nei-
ther FGC nor DFG opposed the bill.
However, Governor Deukmejian vetoed
it on September 26, 1989. In his veto
message, the Governor objected to
"reduc[ing] the two-hearing process into
one concurrent public hearing," finding
that "these changes are not in the pub-
lic's interest.'
4 6
B. Reforming FGC and DFG
At this writing, several bills which
would revamp FGC are pending in
the legislature. Senate Bill 2840
(McCorquodale), introduced on
March 2, 1990, would transfer all of the
powers and duties of FGC to a newly-
created Fish and Wildlife Commission
(FWC). FWC would be composed of
twelve members who would serve four-
year terms; the Governor, Assembly
Speaker, and Senate Rules Committee
would each appoint four members.
Senator McCorquodale's bill sets forth
qualifications for the members of the
new FWC: specific members would rep-
resent various interested constituencies,
including hunting organizations, recre-
ational fishing organizations, environ-
mental organizations, commercial fish-
ers who are California residents, animal
protection organizations, and land trust
organizations. Other FWC members
would include persons with postsec-
ondary degrees in wildlife management,
marine biology, and fisheries biology;
and three public members.
Assembly Constitutional Amend-
ment 51 (Campbell), as amended June
28, would similarly replace the existing
FGC with a Fish and Wildlife
Commission, this one composed of nine
members each serving four-year terms.
The Governor would appoint five of the
members, subject o Senate confirma-
tion; the Senate Rules Committee and
the Assembly Speaker would each
appoint two members. ACA 51 also sets
forth qualifications for membership:
specified members must have experi-
ence in wildlife management, marine
biology and fisheries biology; other
members would represent hunters, land
trusts, recreational sportfishers, environ-
mental organizations, and commercial
fishers; finally, one member would be a
public member. Additionally, ACA 51
attempts to ensure geographical repre-
sentation: the five gubernatorial
appointees must each represent one of
five fish and game districts; and the four
legislative appointments must be split
between northern and southern
California representatives.
A package of bills carried by
Assemblymember Jim Costa takes a dif-
ferent approach altogether. As amended
April 16, Assembly Bill 3160 (Costa)
would transform FGC into a mere advi-
sory committee, and transfer FGC's
existing powers and duties to DFG.
Assembly Bill 3159 (Costa), as intro-
duced February 22, 1990, would rename
DFG as "Department of Fish and
Wildlife" (DFW), and declare that the
Department has been delegated the pri-
mary responsibility for the protection
and preservation of the fish, wildlife,
and native plants of California. The bill
also requires all state and local agencies
to give "great weight" to the findings of
DFW regarding the protection, preserva-
tion, restoration, and maintenance of
fish, wildlife, and native plants and the
habitat necessary for those purposes.
Finally, Assembly Bill 3158 (Costa)
attempts to increase DFW's revenues by
transferring from FGC to DFW the
authority to set fees for the issuance of
all licenses, tags, certificates, and other
entitlements. Where no fee is set in
statute, DFW would be allowed to set
one. The bill would also authorize DFW
to establish a fee to cover its reasonable
costs for monitoring and enforcing
resources protection policies relating to
state- and local agency-funded or
approved projects.
C. Proposed "Species of Serious
Concern" Category
One attempt to change the state's
system of protecting species has come
from within the Commission. In
February 1989, FGC proposed regulation
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changes that would have made listing
"permissive" rather than "mandatory";
they also would have required DFG to
prepare recovery plans in lieu of the list-
ing of species as threatened or endan-
gered.'47
Following the receipt of outraged
comments from conservationists, the
Commission amended the language of
its proposed regulatory changes. The
amended language would have provided
for the establishment of a list of "species
of serious concern," in addition to the
two existing designations of threatened
and endangered. Further, the amended
language would have required DFG to
prepare recovery plans for all threatened
and endangered species, as well as for
species of serious concern. '
The Commission explained that the
purpose of the proposed rule was to
enable it to identify species which are
not yet threatened or endangered, but
which are of "serious concern" because
of dwindling populations or habitat. The
Commission also noted that it wanted
regulations requiring DFG to prepare
recovery plans, which would help
enhance threatened or endangered
species so they may eventually be taken
off the protective lists.
This regulatory proposal worried
environmental groups. While many con-
servationists supported the idea of a
"serious concern" category to monitor
declining species, some were fearful
that the Commission would use this new
classification to avoid listing species-a
fear prompted particularly by the lan-
guage of the regulation as originally
proposed. Also, because CESA provides
protection only for species listed as
threatened or endangered, this new cate-
gory would offer no substantive protec-
tive status.
In part because of the reaction from
environmental groups, the Commission
dropped this proposal in June 1989.' 4 It
is, however, still studying the possibility
of creating this category.
D. Protecting Species
Without Using CESA
Some conservationists are using a
different approach-the initiative pro-
cess-in seeking increased protection
for species in the state. In 1986, a state
statute which granted protective status
to the mountain lion expired.'0
Subsequently, FGC approved two
mountain lion hunts, both of which were
struck down by the San Francisco
Superior Court.5 ' The Mountain Lion
Preservation Foundation recently spon-
sored an initiative that removes the
mountain lion issue from FGC and DFG
and reestablishes in statute protections
for California's mountain lions.
Proposition 117, which was successful
on the June 1990 ballot, prohibits trophy
hunting of mountain lions and allocates
$30 million per year for thirty years to
acquire habitat for mountain lions, deer,
and threatened and endangered species.
This proposal is unique in that it is
the first attempt to propose protection
for an individual species through the ini-
tiative process. Some DFG representa-
tives are worried that if more are pro-
posed for other species, California could
end up with a crazy-quilt of laws to pro-
tect individual groups of wildlife.
Another concern is that this and future
similar initiatives will undermine the
very purpose of CESA.
But perhaps the biggest worry at
DFG regarding this proposal is that the
$30 million fund to protect the mountain
lion and acquire habitat must come from
existing revenue sources; the initiative
makes no provision for new money.
Because no new funds are provided,
DFG fears that existing and vital pro-
grams will have to be curtailed. DFG
also argues that, in relation to listed
species, the mountain lion has a healthy
population level; if CESA dollars are
diverted to finance Proposition 117, list-
ed species could suffer as a result of this
initiative.'52
Sharon Negri, a leader in the fight for
this initiative, disputes DFG's concerns.
She states that the initiative would
not have been necessary had the
Commission not insisted on approving a
hunt. Proposition 117 will not weaken
wildlife protection, she notes, but rather
strengthen it by demonstrating to the
legislature and the Governor that the
people of California will not tolerate
needless destruction of wildlife."'
V. CONCLUSION
In its five-year existence, CESA
has-at best-delayed the extinction of
280 California species. If the legislature
truly seeks to prevent the extinction of
the 280 species listed by FGC and
650 others which-according to
DFG-deserve listing now, it must act
expeditiously to overhaul the statute, its
regulatory process, and the agencies
responsible for implementing it.
Strengthening the language of the
statute itself, while a band-aid approach,
is one place to start. A variation on SB
999's theme would require FGC to
immediately adopt an emergency
amendment to its regulations at the time
it approves a species for listing at its
section 2075.5 "final consideration"
hearing. This step would alleviate some
of the delay in the process while pre-
serving the systematic review of state
agency rulemaking actions by OAL.
At the very least, the legislature
should require FGC to adopt real criteria
for listing species. FGC's existing "cri-
teria" are simply a restatement of the
statutory language, and do not even
attempt to quantify a point at which the
Commission must list. If FGC continues
to balk, the legislature should enact
mandatory listing criteria for it, and
amend CESA to require FGC to rely
solely upon the scientific information
produced by DFG and/or the petitioner
in support of listing.
Additionally, the legislature should
waste no time in enacting a strong rule
outlawing ex parte contacts by or with
FGC commissioners during the penden-
cy of any rulemaking proceeding,
including proceedings to list species.
Off-the-record contacts during an ongo-
ing proceeding, to which no one has an
opportunity to respond, completely
defeat the purpose of the Administrative
Procedure Act and the Bagley-Keene
Open Meetings Act-both of which are
fully applicable to FGC. An ex parte
prohibition during a listing proceeding
is particularly appropriate, because it is
quasijudicial in nature; it focuses on the
eligibility of a single species for listing.
Also, in light of the commissioners'
apparent unfamiliarity with state con-
flict-of-interest prohibitions, the
Resources Agency (in conjunction with
the Fair Political Practices Commission)
should sponsor a detailed ethics training
program for all members of its con-
stituent boards and commissions.
Rather than curing the symptoms of
the problem, however, the legislature
should tackle the disease: the structural
flaws which prevent FGC and DFG
from fulfilling their statutory mandates.
As noted by the Little Hoover
Commission, FGC's focus is simply out-
dated; its hunters-only membership and
apparent bias are simply inconsistent
with the majority of environmentally-
enlightened Californians. Just as the leg-
islature recently abolished the California
Waste Management Board for its failure
to tackle this state's serious solid waste
crisis with modem-day solutions such as
recycling and source reduction,'54 the
legislature must reestablish its intent
with regard to the priorities of DFG and
FGC, to eliminate the traditional "struc-
tured-taking" purpose of the agencies
and infuse them with priorities of
preservation and enhancement.
However, the approaches taken in SB
2840, ACA 51, and the Costa package
are seriously flawed. SB 2840 and ACA
The California Regulatory Law Reporter Vol. 10, Nos. 2 & 3 (Sprin,/Summer 1990)
LE FEATURE ARTICLE
51 suffer from the Sacramento-style
assumption that government operates
properly through "governance by vec-
tor." That is, an agency should represent
the profit-stake interests (the "players")
concerned about its decisions. State pol-
icy therefore is the end result of the
preferences of these actors, each vector-
ing their influence into a final mix.
However, the very notion of govern-
ment in many contexts is the recognition
of the structural impossibility of private
interests combining to act in the public
interest. Indeed, the existence of most
regulatory agencies is purportedly justi-
fied by the need for a public substitute
or countervailing adjustment. It is ironic
to create an agency to protect the public
from profit-stake interests, and then turn
that agency over to those very interests
or to their surrogates. In the area of pro-
tecting endangered species, the
Sacramento preoccupation with bringing
all "players" together to resolve public
policy issues is most self-defeating.
Here, the interest vindicated by FGC's
purpose is one of the most underrepre-
sented in the state: the future, the gene
pool of the earth, the inarticulate plants
and animals in danger of extinction.
Both proposals for FGC reform sim-
ply take a list of those with profit-stake
interests, stir in several persons with an
academic or broader perspective, and
declare the stew equitable. However, the
purpose of FGC purportedly is to repre-
sent the state's interest in advancing a
human ethic representing our highest
aspiration: leaving the earth to our lega-
tees without the loss of plants and ani-
mals which will never again appear but
for our protective intervention. Each and
every person governing that agency
should be true to its mission and con-
cerned primarily with the accomplish-
ment of its purpose, not with collateral
or contrary agendas.
While well-intentioned, these
"reform" bills ignore the fact that the
Department of Fish and Game was not
created to safeguard the interests of
hunters, or commercial fishers, or ani-
mal protectionists, or land trust organi-
zations. These special interests are per-
fectly capable of making their views
known to the regulatory agency and to
the legislature. Vesting them with the
actual decisionmaking authority as the
"state" is a form of political immorality.
Any entity permitted to establish state
policy should consist solely of public
members who are untainted by any
pecuniary, personal, or profit-stake
interest in the decisions made.
Worse still, the Costa bills would
wipe out FGC-the only forum before
which the public may express its views
and petition for redress of its
grievances regarding the preservation of
California's flora and fauna. As weak,
biased, and inadequate as the current
FGC may be, it is at least required to
meet in public, make its decisions in
public, and listen to the public.
Transferring FGC's authority to DFG,
no matter what its name may become
and regardless of its new priorities, would
enable a single director to make all poli-
cy decisions behind closed doors-free
from public debate or meaningful input.
The Fish and Game Commission was
created in the California Constitution,
and should not be denigrated into
an advisory board. The existence of
FGC is the structural saving grace of
DFG; without FGC, DFG is like
the Department of Insurance, the
Department of Corporations, and the
Department of Banking-all of which
are regrettably run by a single political
appointee who is not required to hold
open meetings at which the public may
meaningfully debate or contribute to
proposed policies. The answer here is
not to abolish FGC but to strengthen it,
make it independent of the Department
and of all the constituencies which
would control it, and give it the charter,
authority, and resources it must have in
order to accomplish its mission.
If we are serious about our obliga-
tions to the generations to follow us-an
obligation which one might argue goes
to the heart of the human ethical impera-
tive-then our system of protection
must identify those species in danger of
extinction- far enough in advance to
ameliorate the cost of preservation, and
to make it practically possible. And it
must have the authority to protect. To be
sure, that protection may involve an ele-
ment of taking. Where that element of
taking occurs without adequate advance
warning, the general public should be
prepared to pay compensation, and
should not impose extreme costs on a
few private interests for a benefit con-
ferred on all of us and our progeny. We
should be prepared to pay that price. If
we want to change private forces to pro-
tect that which is in jeopardy, it may
hurt all of us a little to do it. But given
the material wealth we have created,
particularly in one of the wealthiest
political jurisdictions in the world, we
have no excuses to offer those who will
judge our performance in the decades to
come. We have no excuses at all.
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